Consider a market for a resource under disequilibrium prices where suppliers and demanders are privately informed about their optimal supply and consumption levels. Strategy-proof market clearing mechanisms give suppliers and demanders dominant strategy incentives to truthfully reveal this information. We describe the class of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms responding well to changes in supplies and demands, as formalized by the "replacement principle" (Thomson, 2007) . Since no symmetry or anonymity conditions are imposed, these mechanisms can implement a wide array of distributional objectives in both indivisible and divisible resource allocation situations. These mechanisms apply to allocation problems involving network constraints modeling necessary conditions for a transfer of the resource from a supplier to a demander.
Introduction
We examine a class of allocation problems including a market under disequilibrium prices and the distribution of workloads or support staff within an organization. In situations that feature the structure of the unilateral assignment problem, we are agnostic as to the appropriateness of any one fairness condition. Our objective is to gain a complete understanding of all well behaved strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms. (As it turns out, BIM's egalitarian rule is an example of the mechanisms we propose.)
Our results apply in a two-sided version of the unilateral assignment problem. Instead of there being stocks of the resource to be allocated, there are suppliers of the resource, with preferences over their supplied amounts. The separation of agents into suppliers and demanders has multiple interpretations. Besides the distinction between producers and consumers, one may consider service providers, some beyond and some below their optimal service load. The allocation problem then becomes transferring shares of the service loads from overloaded providers to under-loaded ones. There is also a bilateral time-matching interpretation where the a network connection models compatibility between a pair of agents.
2
Bilateral assignment problem A resource is to be transferred from its suppliers to its demanders. A supplier can only transfer an amount of the resource to demanders connected to her by a network. Suppliers and demanders have single-peaked preferences over the their supplied and acquired amounts, respectively.
The bilateral assignment problem was introduced by Bochet,İlkılıç, Moulin, and Sethuraman (2012) (hereafter, BIMS) .
3 BIMS also introduce an egalitarian mechanisms for this problem. A defining property of this mechanism is again "equal treatment of equals," incompatible with indivisibilities. (For the special case where resources are divisible, BIMS' egalitarian rule is also an example of the mechanisms we propose.)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the framework and definitions. Section 3 contains descriptions of the set of feasible and efficient allocations for the bilateral and unilateral assignment problems. Section 4 discusses the "replacement principle." Section 5 describes our class of mechanisms and presents the main results concerning them. Section 6 illustrates the distributional objectives that can be achieved using these mechanisms. Though our analysis in Sections 3 through 6 focuses on bilateral assignment problems, in Section 7 we show how our results extend to unilateral assignment problems. An Appendix gathers the proofs not included in the body of the paper.
Framework
A resource, available in either divisible or indivisible units, is to be transferred from a finite group of suppliers/sources S S S to a finite group of demanders/consumers D D D.
4
An agent is any supplier or demander. Let N N N denote the agent set, S ∪ D, and n n n denote its cardinality.
The requirement that a certain supplier can only transfer to certain demanders is modeled by specifying connections in a network. Transfer opportunities are represented by edges in a bipartite graph G G G linking demanders and suppliers: j ∈ D can receive from i ∈ S only if there is an edge, denoted ij ij ij, in graph G. Without loss of generality, we assume that G is connected.
5 For each agent i ∈ N , let Γ(i) Γ(i) Γ(i) denote all the agents j ∈ N that are connected to i in G, i.e. such that ij ∈ G. Each agent i can receive assignment within a range, modeling capacity constraints. We refer to this range as the agent's assignment space and denote it A i A i A i . If the resource is available in indivisible units A i is an interval in Z + .
7 If the resource is available in divisible units A i is an interval in R + . Let X i X i X i denote the upper bound of A i . The agent is equipped with a single-peaked preference relation
8 We refer to p(R i ) as the peak of R i R i R i , or simply as agent i i i's peak when there is no room for confusion. Let
Feasible allocations A feasible allocation is a list x ≡ (x i ) i∈N ∈ A N specifying the assignments for each agent; these assignments are such that there is a matrix (x ij ) 4 The basic mathematical notation is as follows: let {Y i } i∈I be a family of sets Y i indexed by I.
For each y ∈ Y I and each J ⊆ I, we denote by y J the projection of y onto Y J . If x, y ∈ R I , then x ≥ y means that, for each i ∈ I, x i ≥ y i . 5 Formally, G is connected if there is a path between any two agents: for each pair i, j ∈ N , there are k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k l ∈ N such that ik 1 , . . . , k l j ∈ G. To see why this assumption is without loss of generality, note that if it were not met then G could be partitioned into disjoint subgraphs, each connected and indpendent. We could then study each of this subgraphs separately.
6 Graph G[I] is known as the subgraph induced by the nodes in I. 7 Here, an interval is the set {l, l + 1, . . . , l + k} for non-negative integers l and k. 8 As usual P i denotes the asymmetric part of R i .
of non-negative numbers satisfying, for each (i, j 
(ii) x j = i∈S x ij , and (iii) x i = j∈D x ij . If the resource comes in indivisible units, the entries x ij are integers. A matrix (x ij ) (x ij ) (x ij ) implements allocation x x x if it satisfies (i)-(iii). Let Z Z Z denote the set of feasible allocations. Similarly, for each I ⊆ N , let Z(I) Z(I) Z(I) denote the allocations that can be implemented solely within the agents in I.
9
Mechanisms A mechanism ϕ is a function that recommends, for each preference profile R ∈ R N , a unique feasible allocation denoted ϕ(R). For each R ∈ R N , let P (R) P (R) P (R) denote the set of (Pareto) efficient allocations at R. 10 A mechanism ϕ is efficient if it only recommends efficient allocations: for each R ∈ R N , ϕ(R) ∈ P (R). The basic incentive compatibility criterion studied in this paper is strategy-proofness, the requirement that reporting preferences truthfully is a dominant strategy for each agent. A mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof if, for each R ∈ R N , each i ∈ N , and each
Special cases The bilateral and unilateral assignment problems discussed in the Introduction are embedded in this framework as follows: Though our analysis in Sections 3 through 6 focuses on bilateral assignment problems, in Section 7 we show how our results extend to unilateral assignment problems.
A basic instance of the unilateral assignment problem was introduced by Sprumont (1991) . Here, a single stock of an infinitely divisible resource is to be distributed among a group agents whose preferences over assignments are single-peaked. Sprumont's model There is a single demander i, her assignment space A i is {X i }, and the graph G connects all suppliers to demander i, G = {ji : j ∈ S}. For each supplier j, X j = X i and
9 That is, x ∈ Z(I) if x ∈ A I and there is a matrix (
10 An allocation x ∈ Z is (Pareto) efficient at R ∈ R N if there is no x ∈ Z such that for each i ∈ N , x i R i x i and, for at least one i ∈ N , x i P i x i .
Feasibility and efficiency
We now present two lemmas used in the analysis of bilateral assignment problems. These lemmas provide polyhedral descriptions of the the set of feasible and efficient allocations, respectively.
A version of the "Supply-Demand Theorem" (Gale, 1957) yields the following description of the set allocations that are feasible within each group of agents.
Lemma 1 (Feasibility). For each I ⊆ N , x ∈ Z(I) is equivalent to either of the following statements:
We now introduce the key element in the description of the set of efficient allocations, a version of the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of bipartite graph. For each R ∈ R N , we define the imbalance between the supply of a group of suppliers I ⊆ S and the demands of demanders connected to them:
Because f : 2 S → R is super-modular, 11 the class of subsets of S maximizing f is closed under unions and intersections. Thus, there is a unique inclusion-minimal subset of S maximizing f . Let S − S − S − denote it if there is I ⊆ S with f (I) > 0 and let S + S + S + denote its complement in S, S \ S − . Otherwise let S + = S. Thus, at most one of S − and S + is empty. Let 
This partition is the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition corresponding to preference profile R. For each R ∈ R N , let P(R) P(R) P(R) denote the partition of N derived from R in this way. This partition is important in describing the set of efficient allocations.
Lemma 2 (Efficiency). Let R ∈ R N and let S − , S + , D − , D + denote the cells of partition P(R). Then x ∈ P (R) if and only if
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The above Lemma generalizes BIMS description of the efficient set of a bilateral assignment problem (Proposition 1 in BIMS) to situations featuring indivisibilities. In fact, non of the arguments in Proposition 1 of BIMS relies on the divisibility of resources.
12

The replacement principle
There are strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms with a number of undesirable features: their recommended allocations change dramatically in response to small preference variations; their informational requirements are taxing and they are highly bossy in the sense of Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) . These flaws are due to their unstructured response to preference changes. The task addressed here is that of specifying how mechanisms should respond to preference changes.
We build on intuition from a workload allocation problem. When an employee expresses a greater willingness to work, it is reasonable that no other workers are forced to work more as a result. This is an expression of the "replacement principle" in the axiomatic theory of resource allocation. 13 The principle asserts that a change or "replacement" in an agent's preferences ought to affect all other agents in the same way welfare-wise, they are all at least as well off or they are all at most as well off as before the change. As formulated by Thomson (1997) , the condition is:
Welfare-dominance under preference-replacement (WDUPR): For each R ∈ R N , each i ∈ N , and each
Even in Sprumont's basic model (see Section 2) WDUPR is incompatible with basic equity properties (Thomson, 1997) and intuitive strategy-proof mechanisms such as sequential dictatorships do not satisfy it. However, the examples illustrating these incompatibilities are somewhat artificial: the change in an agent's preferences has to be large enough to take an economy were there is too little to distribute to one were there is too much, or conversely. In large scale resource allocation problems this is unlikely to be realistic. Qualifying WDUPR so that it will hold in situations were the preference changes are not this disruptive yields a requirement 12 The background network flow tools used to establish Proposition 1 of BIMS also apply to the case of indivisibilities. See, for instance Corollary 8.7 in Korte and Vygen (2001) .
13 See Thomson (2007 Thomson ( , 1999 for an overview of the literature on the replacement principle. The earliest instance of the property is "agreement" in (Moulin, 1987) .
that is fully compatible with efficiency and various equity notions. This qualified version is satisfied by many intuitively appealing mechanisms in Sprumont's model (Thomson, 1997) .
The challenge is thus to qualify WDUPR, adapting it to the networked environments studied here. A straightforward adaptation of Thomson's qualified WDUPR in a bilateral assignment problem, where every supplier is connected to every demander, is to require that WDUPR holds as long as the change in an agent's preferences does not take an economy where the sum of the demanders' preferred transfers is greater than the sum of suppliers preferred transfers' to one where the opposite is true. The key then is in formalizing how a change in preferences affects overall scarcity under general network constraints.
The Gallai-Edmonds decomposition derived in Section 3 enables us to canonically distinguish a pattern of scarcity or abundance in the relationship between the demands of some agents and the supplies available to them, for any network. For each preference profile R, the corresponding partition of agents into S − , S + , D + , and D − derived in Section 3 is this Gallai-Edmonds decomposition. Each group of demanders in D + is "over-supplied" by the suppliers in S − who can only supply to them because Γ(S − ) = D + . Similarly, each group of suppliers in S + is "over-demanded" by the demanders in D − who can only receive the resource from them because Γ(D − ) = S + .
We will require WDUPR to hold for changes in preferences that do not alter the configuration of over-and under-supply in a networked economy, as formalized by the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition:
In Sprumont's model, replacement-dominance coincides with Thomson's qualified WDUPR. Under efficiency, it also coincides with "replacement monotonicity" (Barberà et al., 1997) . This is the requirement that if an agent's preferences change leading to an increase in her assignment, then all other agents receive at most as much as they did before. This is a restriction on physical assignments and not on welfare. Beyond Sprumont's model, replacement monotonicity can be defined as follows:
Replacement-monotonicity: For each R ∈ R N , each i ∈ S, and each
The statement holds when the roles of S and D are reversed.
Replacement-monotonicity is stronger than replacement-dominance. As we show in Lemma 5 (see Appendix C), a strategy-proof, efficient, and replacement-dominant mechanism satisfies a weak version of replacement-monotonicity.
Adjustment mechanisms
The mechanisms proposed here are described by means of an adjustment process starting from a set of initial allocations. These allocations can be interpreted as providing welfare guarantees: after the adjustment process has ended, each agent is at least as well off as if she had kept her initial assignment.
Intuitively, an adjustment mechanism operates as follows. For all preference profile R inducing the same Gallai-Edmonds decomposition, the adjustment function specifies the same initial allocation, say q 0 . For each agent i, her initial assignment-her component of q 0 -defines the endpoint of an interval from where she is free to choose her preferred assignment. Depending on i's location in the network this interval will be of the form 
, then, upon the release of the excess resources from the agents who were able to obtain their peak assignments, the endpoint of j's interval is adjusted to q 1 j so that, respectively, [0, q
Note that such adjustment will occur only if there is an agent whose peak did lie in her interval. For such an agent, the adjustment will then yield an assignment equal to her peak. Thus, by construction, there will be at most as many adjustments as there are agents, n.
Definition
For each p ∈ A N , we say that p induces C if there is a preference profile R such that
Let H H H consist of all adjustment functions. Each adjustment function g ∈ H specifies a unique mechanism we denote ϕ
We refer to them as adjustment mechanisms. The allocations recommended by ϕ g are computed as follows: for each
In Sprumont's model, adjustment mechanisms are closely related to the mechanisms introduced by Barberà et al. (1997) and Massó and Neme (2007) . Examples of adjustment mechanisms can be found in Section 6.
Main results
Theorem 1. Every strategy-proof, efficient, and replacement-dominant mechanism is an adjustment mechanism.
Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and replacement dominance are thus sufficient conditions for a mechanism to belong to the class of adjustment mechanisms. That is, if ϕ is a mechanism satisfying these properties, then there is an adjustment function g ∈ H such that ϕ = ϕ g . Additionally, every adjustment mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. Proposition 1. If g ∈ H, then ϕ g is strategy-proof and efficient.
By Lemma 5 (in Appendix C), a strategy-proof, efficient and replacement-dominant mechanism satisfies a weak version replacement-monotonicity: in the range of preferences for which the hypothesis of replacement-dominance is satisfied, the mechanism will be replacement-monotonic. Thus, the next corollary follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 (in Appendix C).
Corollary 1. Every strategy-proof, efficient, and replacement-monotonic mechanism is an adjustment mechanism.
Welfare guarantees
We identify adjustment mechanisms achieving a wide range of welfare guarantees. These guarantees specify lower bounds on the welfare attainable by each agent. In fact, for any feasible allocation, we can find an adjustment mechanism that makes assignments that each agent finds at least as desirable as receiving her component of the allocation.
We now formalize the requirements on g ∈ G that will ensure this. Let z ∈ Z be the allocation chosen as a welfare guarantee. Let (z ij ) denote a matrix implementing
) denote the matrix obtained form (z ij ) as follows:
Proposition 2. Let z ∈ Z and g ∈ H be such that
Then, for each R ∈ R N and each i ∈ N , ϕ
. That is, a supplier in S − only has potential demanders in D + . Note that S + = Γ(D − ). That is, a demander in D − only has potential suppliers in S + . Thus,
. Moreover, by Proposition 1, ϕ g (R) ∈ P (R). Thus, by the Efficiency Lemma,
Next, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for an adjustment mechanism to satisfy the "voluntary trade" property used in BIMS' characterization of the egalitarian mechanism. Voluntary trade is the requirement that each agent finds what she gets at least as desirable as receiving nothing. If receiving a null assignment can be viewed as an outside option, it amounts to individual rationality.
Corollary 2. A strategy-proof, efficient, and replacement-dominant mechanism ϕ satisfies voluntary trade if and only if there is g ∈ H such that for each C ∈ C, q C = 0 and ϕ = ϕ g .
Proof. Let ϕ denote a mechanism satisfying the above properties. By Theorem 1, there is g ∈ H such that ϕ = ϕ g . Suppose g does not satisfy (2): there is C ∈ C such that q C = 0. Thus, there is k ∈ S such that q 
Then, by single-peakedness, 0 P j ϕ j (R). This contradicts the assumption that ϕ satisfies voluntary trade. We obtain an analogous contradiction if k ∈ S \ C. Conversely, if g ∈ H is such that (2) holds, Proposition 2 implies that ϕ g satisfies voluntary trade.
v Corollary 2 illustrates how demanding voluntary trade is. An adjustment rule satisfying it cannot guarantee any agent a positive amount of the resource.
The converse of Theorem 1
We identify the adjustment mechanisms satisfying replacement-dominance. The following condition on g ∈ H must be added to (a),(b), and (c):
Let G G G ⊆ H denote the class of adjustment functions satisfying (d). In the context of Sprumont's model, the class of adjustment mechanisms specified by a g ∈ G coincides with the class of mechanisms introduced by Barberà et al. (1997) .
Proposition 3. If g ∈ G, then ϕ g is strategy-proof, efficient, and replacementdominant.
Theorem 2. A mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof, efficient, and replacement-dominant if and only if there is g ∈ G such that ϕ = ϕ g .
Examples and applications
Though the analysis in this paper applies to situations where allocation cannot rely on price adjustments, this does not necessarily rule out monetary considerations. In the allocation of workloads, there is a cost or wage associated with allocating a unit of the workload to each agent though these costs are taken to be fixed parameters. These parameters are likely to be important in recommending an allocation: the mechanism designer may need to minimize her total wage expenditure conditional on the workloads being distributed efficiently. A consequence of our analysis is that she could simultaneously ensure incentive compatibility, efficiency, and minimize total expenditures. We formalize these considerations associating a numeric benefit/cost measure to each agent. Here, we describe examples of adjustment mechanisms based on this idea. These mechanisms include the egalitarian mechanisms of BIM and BIMS. As we will see, the chosen distributional objective in BIM and BIMS, egalitarianism, can be implemented by assigning all agents the same benefit/cost measure. As in BIM and BIMS, we focus on the case where resources are perfectly divisible.
The numeric benefit/cost measure we associate with each agent is a concave/convex function. For each i ∈ N , let F i F i F i denote the class of strictly concave and continuous functions f i : A i → R.
14 The following mechanisms are indexed or parameterized by a profile f ∈ F N .
14 The mechanisms described here are related to the parametric mechanisms characterized by
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Separably concave mechanism of parameterization f ∈ F
By the Feasibility and Efficiency Lemmas, {x ∈ P (R) : x ≤ p(R)} is a bounded polyhedron defined by linear inequalities. Thus, it is a compact and convex subset of R N + . Moreover, since the objective in the optimization problem above is a strictly concave function, every separably concave mechanism is well defined.
BIMS' egalitarian mechanism is the separably concave mechanism parameterized by f ∈ F N where, for each i ∈ N , f i (x i ) = −x 2 i . To see this, recall that BIMS' egalitarian mechanism is defined as the Lorenz-dominant 15 element in the subset of efficient allocations at which no agent is assigned more than her peak: for each R ∈ R N , the BIMS-egalitarian allocation is the Lorenz-dominant point in {x ∈ P (R) : x ≤ p(R)}. This implies that the BIMS-egalitarian allocation maximizes N −x 2 i over the polytope {x ∈ P (R) : x ≤ p(R)} (Schmeidler, 1979) . To see that the separably concave mechanisms are indeed adjustment mechanisms we can specify their adjustment functions.
Proposition 4. For each f ∈ F
N the adjustment function corresponding to ϕ f is g :
q C is allocation assigning 0 to each agent;
(ii) and, if q 0 ≡ q C and, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, q t ≡ g(q t−1 , p), where
, and
Unilateral assignment
The results derived for the bilateral assignment problems studied until now can be extended to unilateral assignment problems. Firstly, observe that unilateral assign- Young (1987) in the context of bankruptcy problems. (See Thomson (2003) for a survey of bankruptcy problems.) They are also reminiscent of the class of "collectively rational mechanisms" in the axiomatic theory of bargaining (Lensberg, 1987) . 
14 ment problems can be viewed as special cases of bilateral problems: simply take the demanders' peaks as fixed amounts to be allocated among suppliers subject to the network constraints. More formally, recall from Section 2 that in unilateral assignment problems each demander i has a singleton assignment space A i = {X i }. To nest a unilateral problem in a bilateral one, it suffices to ensure that in the bilateral problem we recommend allocations whereby each demander i receives exactly X i . By the Feasibility Lemma, a necessary and sufficient condition for it to be possible to allocate the demand profile X D among the suppliers is that,
Under this condition we can still use the Efficiency Lemma to describe efficient allocations in unilateral problems by fixing demander preferences so that, for each demander i, p(R i ) = X i .
Corollary 3. Suppose that condition (3) is satisfied and let ϕ denote a mechanism defined on the domain of preference profiles R ∈ R N such that p(R D ) = X D . Then ϕ is strategy-proof, efficient, replacement-dominant, and ensures that each demander i is assigned X i if and only if there is g ∈ H such that for each C ∈ C and each i ∈ D, q
The proof is analogous to that of Corollary 2 and is thus omitted. We now define the analogues of the separably concave mechanisms defined in the previous section for unilateral problems.
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By the same argument in Section 6, BIM's egalitarian mechanism is the separably concave mechanism parametrized by f ∈ F S where, for each i ∈ N , f i (x i ) = −x s s s and sink node t t t to the set of nodes in G and define the arc set of G(λ) is to be
Each arc (i, j) ∈ A has an arc capacity-an upper bound on the amount that can traverse through the arc (i, j) , from node i to node j-given by
An s − t s − t s − t flow in network G(λ) specifies an amount traversing each arc in G(λ), φ ∈ R A such that,
(the flow through an arc does not exceed the arc's capacity);
(ii) for each i ∈ S, φ (s,i) = j∈D φ (i,j) , and, for each i ∈ D, φ (i,t) = j∈S φ (j,i) (for each node other than s or t the amount entering that node is the same as the amount exiting it).
An s − t flow φ φ φ is maximal if i∈N φ (s,i) is greater than that of any other s − t flow. A cut in in network G(λ) is a subset K ⊆ N ∪ {s} containing s. The capacity of a cut K is given by i∈C,j / ∈C c (i, j) . A min-cut is a minimum capacity cut. Let R ∈ R N and p ≡ p(R). Consider network G(p). By the max-flow min-cut theorem, the maximal s−t flow is equal to the minimum capacity of a cut in network G(p). Note that if K is a min-cut we have
Otherwise, K ∩ D Γ(K ∩ S) and the cut has an infinite capacity. If C is such that [K ∩ D] \ Γ(K ∩ S) = ∅, its capacity could be further reduced. In both cases C is not a min-cut. By (4), if K is a min-cut, its capacity is
Note that the class of cuts minimizing (5) is closed under unions and intersections. Thus, there is a unique inclusion-minimal min-cut
This yields an equivalent description of partition P(R).
Lemma 3. Let R ∈ R N and P(R) = {S − , S + , D − , D + }. 
By the max-flow min-cut theorem, there is a maximal flow φ ∈ R A in network G(x) with value equal to the minimum capacity of a cut in the network. Since, for each I ⊆ N , I x i ≤ Γ(I) x j , this cut is {s} and its capacity is
Suppose that there is i ∈ N with (i) and (ii) in Lemma 1 are immediate. Conversely, suppose that x ∈ R N + is such that (i)-(ii) hold. Then, for each I ⊆ S ,
Similarly, for each J ⊆ S , J x i ≤ J X s and J x i ≤ Γ(J;N ) x i . Thus, for each I ⊆ B ,
x i , and, for each J ⊆ S ,
We have already shown these conditions to be necessary and sufficient for the feasibility of x in the absence of the upper bounds (X i ) i∈N . For each i ∈ S , letting I ≡ {i} in (6),
B Proof of Propositions 1 and 3
The proof relies on the following Lemma.
Lemma 4. Let R ∈ R N and i ∈ N . Let R ∈ R N be such that, for each j ∈ N \ {i}, R j = R j . Let p ≡ p(R) and p ≡ p(R ). Let K and K denote the inclusion-wise minimal min-cuts in G(p) and G(p ), respectively.
Moreover, the min-cuts in G(p) are precisely the minimizers of (7). (a) Let i ∈ S ∩ K and p i ≥ p i . Since the capacity of a cut in network G(p) is no greater than its capacity in G(p ),
Similarly, the capacity of each cut in G(p ) not containing i is p i − p i ≥ 0 less than its capacity in G(p) and the capacity of each cut in G(p ) containing i is the same as in
Proof of Propositions 1 and 3. Let g ∈ H. We first prove that ϕ g satisfies the properties in Proposition 1. Let R ∈ R N , p ≡ p(R), and suppose that p induces C.
We prove that q n ∈ P (R). By the definition of an adjustment function g, q n is in By (a) in the definition of adjustment function g, for each j ∈ N \ {i}, q n j = p j .
17 By Lemma 3, since
g is strategy-proof: Let i ∈ N and R ∈ R N be such that, for each j ∈ N \ {i},
. We prove that q
we are done, so assume otherwise. Throughout, we use the facts that q n ∈ P (R) and x ∈ P (R ). We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: P(R) = P(R ). Suppose that i ∈ S − . Since ϕ g is efficient, by the Efficiency Lemma, q 
we arrive at the same conclusion.
Case 2: P(R) = P(R ). Suppose that i ∈ S − . By Lemma 4, p i > p i or else
is received by demanders in 17 An adjustment occurs, i.e. q t = q t−1 , only if there is l ∈ N such that p l = q t−1 l and p l = q t l . Thus, if n − 1 adjustments have taken place at least n − 1 agents are receiving their peaks.
18 Let K and K are the inclusion-minimal min-cuts in G(p) and G(p ) respectively. By Lemma 3,
Thus K is a min-cut in G(p ) and K is a min-cut in G(p). Since both are inclusion-minimal, K = K . By Lemma 3, this would yield P(R) = P(R ), counter to our assumption.
Similarly, by the definition of P(R ), Γ(L) ⊆ S + . By the Efficiency Lemma, q n S − ∪D + ∈ Z(S − ∪ D + ). Thus, the demanders in L can receive resources solely from suppliers in K. Thus, q
Since p −i = p −i , combining (8) and (9) 
Next, suppose that R is such that P(R) = P(R ) and i ∈ S + . By Lemma 4,
By analogous arguments to those above we arrive at
The cases where i ∈ D − and i ∈ D + are symmetric.
g is replacement-dominant: To prove Proposition 3 assume that g is in G, not just in H. Let i ∈ N andR ∈ R N be such that, for each j ∈ N \ {i}, R j =R j . Assume, as in the hypothesis of replacement-dominance, that P(R) = P(R). By Lemma 3, p(R) and p(R) induce C. Thus, ϕ(R) ≡q n where,q 0 ≡ q C and Lemma,
Suppose the former holds. By the Efficiency Lemma, since P(R) = P(R ),
Thus, by the Efficiency Lemma and single-peakedness,
Suppose, instead that [there is j ∈ D + such that x j > x j ]. By the Efficiency Lemma, since
By the Efficiency Lemma and singlepeakedness, we reach the same conclusion as in (10). Symmetrically, we arrive at the same statement when
Combining (10) and (11), confirms the first statement in (i) when {i} = I ⊆ K. Now, suppose that |I| > 1, say I ≡ {1, . . . , k}. By Lemma 4, P(R) = P(R 1 , R −1 ) = P(R {1,2} , R N \{1,2} ) = · · · = P(R ). We can thus repeat the argument for |I| = 1 (|I|-times) and arrive at the first statement in (i) . A fully analogous argument establishes the second statement in (i) , where I ⊆ L.
The first statement in (ii) now follow by applying (i) first to S and then to D . Likewise, the case where
Next, we show that our axioms imply two technically useful properties.
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Uncompromisingness: For each R ∈ R N , each i ∈ N , and each
Lemma 6. A strategy-proof, efficient, and replacement-dominant mechanism is peaks-only and uncompromising.
Proof. Let ϕ be a strategy-proof, efficient, and replacement-dominant mechanism.
By strategy-proofness and efficiency,
Repeating this argument n − 1 more times we find that ϕ(R) = ϕ(R ). This establishes peaks-only. 
C.2 Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
By Proposition 1, if g ∈ H, ϕ g is strategy-proof and efficient. By Proposition 3, if g ∈ G ⊆ H, then ϕ g is also replacement-dominant. Conversely, let ϕ denote a strategy-proof, efficient, and replacement-dominant mechanism. We prove that there is a g ∈ H such that ϕ = ϕ g . (Lemma 5 establishes condition (d) in Section 5.2.2.) Notation: If R, R t ,R,R t , · · · ∈ R N , we let p ≡ p(R),p ≡ p(R),p t ≡ p(R t ), and so forth. By Lemma 6, ϕ satisfies peaks-only and uncompromisingness. We will use these facts throughout without further reference to the Lemma. We now define our candidate adjustment function: let g : Z × A N → Z be such that, for each p ∈ A N ,
(ii) and, if q 0 = q C , for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let g(q t−1 , p) ≡ ϕ(R t ) where R t ∈ R N is s.t. p 
This specification of g is meaningful because ϕ is peaks-only.
Step 1. If p ∈ A N induces C, then q C is as defined in Section 5.1.
Proof. Suppose that p induces C. By (i) and (ii) in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, r[C] induces C as well. Thus, by (i) and ( Step 2. If p ∈ A N induces C and q 0 = q C , then, for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, g(q t−1 , p)| C ∈ Z(C) and g(q t−1 , p)| N \C ∈ Z(N \ C). 
From (13) 
